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Abstract
This study drew on the literature in motivated reasoning and 2009 Pew survey data to 
examine the roles of partisanship, education, news exposure, and their interactions in 
the misperception that health care reform would create “death panels.” Radio news 
exposure encouraged the misperception only among Republicans, while newspaper 
exposure discouraged it, especially among non-Republicans. But rather than polarize 
perceptions along partisan lines as predicted, Fox News exposure contributed 
to misperception mainstreaming. Finally, this study identified a complex role for 
education in both inhibiting misperceptions (as a main effect) and promoting them (as 
an interaction with Fox News exposure).
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On August 7, 2009, former vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin introduced the 
phrase “death panel” into American political discourse by posting a note on Facebook 
that read, in part,
The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby with 
Down Syndrome will have to stand in front of Obama’s “death panel” so his 
bureaucrats can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their “level of 
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productivity in society,” whether they are worthy of health care. Such a system 
is downright evil.1
The claim that President Barack Obama’s proposed health care reform would create 
death panels apparently arose out of a provision that would reimburse doctors for 
counseling Medicare patients on end-of-life decisions. Some conservatives like Betsy 
McCaughey had been arguing for months that the provision would push seniors toward 
euthanasia, but Palin’s post, with its compelling frame and vivid depiction of liberal 
government overreach, put these claims on the front page. Palin’s death panel claim 
was debunked by the mainstream press and policy experts across the political spec-
trum.2 PolitiFact later named it their “Lie of the Year,” and FactCheck.org listed it 
among their “Whoppers of the Year.”3 But some Republicans and conservative pun-
dits took up the charge, notably Senator Charles Grassley, former House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich, radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh, and then Fox News hosts Glenn 
Beck and Sean Hannity. The provision reimbursing end-of-life counseling was 
removed from the bill, but the death panel misperception remained. A Pew survey 
released August 20, 2009, found that 86% of Americans had heard of the death panel 
claims, and of those who had, 30% believed them.4 This misperception, the report 
pointed out, was more pronounced among Republicans (of whom 47% believed it) and 
regular viewers of Fox News (45%). The latter results are not surprising in either case. 
Members of one party are prone to misperceptions of the other party because party-
serving misperceptions serve their directional processing goals,5 and Lodge and Taber 
contend directional goals in politics trump accuracy goals for most people most of the 
time.6 Motivated reasoning encompasses selective exposure to congenial information, 
as well as biased processing of the information one does encounter.7 The trend toward 
“niche news” means that it has become easier for partisans to find news that suits their 
predispositions.8 Fox News, which has a track record of contributing to partisan 
misperceptions,9 was an innovator in carving out a partisan niche audience.10
This study examines the roles of partisanship and news exposure (both traditional 
and partisan) in the death panel misperception, particularly in light of evidence that 
partisanship and news exposure can interact to polarize attitudes and beliefs.11 This 
study also investigates the potentially conflicting roles of education in this process. 
Political knowledge and education should help prevent misperceptions, but they are 
double-edged swords. Knowledgeable partisans engage in more selective exposure, 
and higher levels of knowledge may enable partisans and consumers of partisan news 
to better defend mistaken beliefs.12
Motivated Reasoning
Dual-process models of persuasion, such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) 
and the heuristic-systematic model (HSM), suggest a continuum of message process-
ing from peripheral or heuristic processing, which attends mostly to heuristic cues in 
the message, to central or systematic processing, which focuses and elaborates on the 
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message’s arguments.13 Because the latter mode is more effortful and because humans 
are assumed to be cognitive misers, central/systematic processing requires both ability 
(knowledge, lack of distraction) and motivation (involvement). However, motivation 
to process can take different forms. These models assume that the desire to hold accu-
rate attitudes is the primary processing motive, but both the revised ELM and the 
HSM recognize that there may be directional goals in processing, such as ego defense 
or impression management.14 Most relevant to the current discussion is ego defense, 
which would include preserving or enhancing one’s self-esteem or defending attitudes 
that are central to the self-concept (one’s idea of one’s self), while impression man-
agement is about attempting to present a favorable image of one’s self to others.
Processing with an end goal in mind or to defend attitudes or beliefs that are closely 
related with one’s self-concept is called motivated reasoning or motivated (or hot) 
cognition.15 Contrary to the assumptions of the ELM and HSM, the literature on moti-
vated reasoning in political contexts suggests that “most people, most of the time act 
as partisan reasoners.”16 In Lodge and Taber’s typology, partisan reasoners have 
strong directional goals and weak accuracy goals as they search and process informa-
tion.17 They prefer information that is consistent with their existing beliefs and atti-
tudes,18 and they engage in biased processing of the information they encounter, 
counterarguing information that is not congenial to their predispositions.19 Let us 
examine these two mechanisms of motivated reasoning in more detail.
Selective exposure. Since the concept of selective exposure was introduced,20 its 
robustness and even existence have been debated.21 A recent meta-analysis suggests 
people have a moderate preference for congenial information.22 The analysis exam-
ined several moderators and found that six of the seven defensive motivation modera-
tors were significant, including commitment to one’s predisposition and the relevance 
of the topic to one’s enduring values. This is important in light of the fact that selective 
exposure research has included a wide variety of topics, many of which were not 
politically relevant.23
Selective exposure has proven to be quite robust in a political context. In her aptly 
titled book, Niche News, Stroud demonstrates that when audiences have a choice, they 
tend to seek out news sources that are perceived as matching their political predisposi-
tions.24 For instance, conservatives and Republicans are three times as likely as liber-
als and Democrats to watch Fox News, while liberals and Democrats are twice as 
likely as conservatives and Republicans to watch MSNBC or CNN. The disparity is 
even more pronounced online (a medium with lots of choice) for liberal and conserva-
tive websites. Other recent work on political selective exposure bears this out, includ-
ing a survey in which liberals were less likely to watch Fox News and more likely to 
watch CNN25 and a survey experiment where identical stories that varied only in their 
branding nevertheless attracted partisan audiences.26
Biased processing. There is ample evidence that partisanship contributes to biased 
processing of information. Motivated reasoners may give relatively little scrutiny to 
messages that are consonant with their existing attitudes, but they may expend consid-
erable cognitive resources to marshal counterarguments against messages that run 
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counter to their attitudes. In studies where people are confronted with both congruent 
and counterattitudinal information about salient political issues, they view the congru-
ent material as being of higher quality than the discrepant material, and they counter-
argue the discrepant information to such an extent that their original attitudes or beliefs 
are strengthened.27 They may dismiss noncongenial information as biased, as in the 
hostile media phenomenon, in which partisans on both sides of a divide may look at 
the same media message and both perceive media bias against themselves, but those 
with no affiliation perceive no bias at all.28
Specifically regarding political misperceptions, researchers have consistently 
found a role for political values,29 especially party identification.30 For instance, in 
1988 half of strong Democrats said inflation had gotten worse since 1980, when 
Republican Ronald Reagan was elected, even though the inflation rate had decreased 
from 13.5% to 4.1%. In 2000, Republicans, on average, believed that the crime rate 
had increased since 1992, during Democrat Bill Clinton’s tenure, when in fact it had 
decreased by 27%.31 Nyhan noted that while Republicans were seven times more 
likely than Democrats to believe Obama was not born in the United States, Democrats 
were five times more likely than Republicans to believe the federal government (then 
headed by the Bush administration) was involved in a conspiracy that allowed the 
September 11 attacks to happen.32 Republicans were more likely to hold mispercep-
tions of Iraq that favored the Bush administration.33 In the 2010 election, Republicans 
were especially likely to incorrectly believe that income taxes had gone up under 
Obama and that the Affordable Care Act was projected to increase the deficit.34 And 
Nyhan found Republicans were more likely to believe in death panels.35 A similar 
finding is expected here.
H1: Party identification will be related to death panel misperception, such that 
the misperception is more likely for Republicans.
Partisan and Traditional News
What Iyengar and Hahn called “the revival of selective exposure”36 reflects a news 
media environment that seems tailor-made for partisan selection, given the emergence 
of the Internet as a news medium and a trend in which “cable news networks and 
programs have increasingly defined themselves in relation to particular political per-
spectives.”37 Mullainathan and Shleifer argued that if we assume an audience that is 
politically polarized and that prefers news that confirms its beliefs, greater competi-
tion should lead profit-maximizing news organizations to segment the market by 
slanting the news in different directions.38 This appears to be what has happened in 
cable news. News Corp’s creation of Fox News filled an underserved market niche—
conservatives who consider the mainstream media to have a liberal bias.39 Apparently 
seeking a similar niche, MSNBC’s more recent shift to the left coincided with a surge 
in its own ratings.40 Journalism review articles have discussed the partisanship on 
display on Fox News on the right and MSNBC on the left.41
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Academic content analyses generally have found that Fox News was more support-
ive of the Bush administration and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than CNN or the 
broadcast networks.42 Fox News was more dismissive of climate change than CNN 
and MSNBC, and it was the only channel on which guests who doubted climate change 
outnumbered those who did not.43 In domestic politics, Fox News’s website was more 
likely to feature news embarrassing to Democrats than news embarrassing to 
Republicans, and its coverage of the 2004 debates and national party conventions was 
more critical of John Kerry than of Bush and was less evenhanded than CNN’s cover-
age.44 A counterpoint to these findings came from a study that looked at news attention 
rather than tone, arguing that content analyses that measure tone may reflect the 
observer’s political leanings rather than that of the content. This study concluded that 
Fox News favored Kerry over Bush in 2004 more than any other cable news channel 
or broadcast network.45
So while content analyses are important, perhaps more telling is evidence of effects. 
Surveys demonstrate significant pro-Republican effects on voting behavior46 and on 
change in attitudes toward candidates from exposure to Fox News.47 The latter study 
found no effects from exposure to CNN or MSNBC. Similarly, an experiment found 
that while CNN commentary had little effect on who its viewers thought won a 2004 
presidential debate, the Fox News commentary had a significant effect on those who 
saw it, changing a thirty-point postdebate margin for Kerry into a four-point margin 
for Bush.48
More relevant to the current research is evidence that Fox News also has been iden-
tified as contributing to political misperceptions promoted by conservatives. Those 
who primarily watched Fox News were twice as likely as those relying on other news 
sources to hold at least one misperception about the war in Iraq, such as that Saddam 
Hussein was positively and closely linked to al-Qaeda and that weapons of mass 
destruction had been found in Iraq.49 Specifically regarding death panels, Nyhan con-
cluded that Fox News exposure was positively related to misperceptions.50 A similar 
finding is expected here.
H2: Those who regularly view Fox News will be more likely to believe the 
death panel misperception than those who do not.
RQ1: Will regular use of other news sources affect death panel misperception?
The Interaction of Partisanship and News Exposure
The motivated reasoning literature demonstrates that partisans from two sides who are 
exposed to both congenial and uncongenial information end up further apart than 
when they began.51 That is with evenhanded information. Since partisans tend to seek 
congenial information and engage in biased processing, an interaction between parti-
sanship and exposure to news that results in polarization would be consistent with the 
motivated reasoning literature. Kull and colleagues found that among those with the 
lowest levels of news exposure, Bush supporters were twice as likely as supporters of 
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a Democrat to hold misperceptions about the Iraq War. But among those with the 
highest levels of news exposure, Bush supporters were five times as likely to hold 
misperceptions as supporters of a Democrat.52
For partisan news sources, the motivated reasoning literature would again predict 
an interaction, although this would be based exclusively on biased processing and 
dismissing incongruent information.53 The empirical findings are not as clear here. 
Certainly it seems that effects of partisanship and congenial news exposure compound, 
such that partisans who use congenial sources diverge the most in their beliefs.54 But 
it is not clear that they interact. There appears to be a persuasion effect for partisans 
who are exposed to a noncongenial news source either by choice55 or random 
assignment.56
H3: Party identification will interact with (1) exposure to death panel news and 
(2) Fox News viewership such that exposure and Fox News viewership will 
amplify party differences in belief in death panels.
RQ2: How will party identification interact with other news sources?
Education: Main Effects and Interactions 
in Predicting Misperceptions
Education is often used as a proxy for political knowledge in secondary research based 
on surveys where knowledge was not directly assessed,57 because education is the 
strongest correlate of political knowledge, with a typical zero-order correlation of 
about .55.58 Education performs about as well as political knowledge in predicting 
political decisions, and both have been used, either alone or together, as operationaliza-
tions for political sophistication.59 Because they are more likely to hold factual beliefs, 
not surprisingly, people with more education are less susceptible to misperceptions.60
H4: Education will be negatively related to believing in death panels.
However, this main effect of education may be qualified by an interaction with 
partisanship. Cognitive elaboration (both support arguments and counterarguments) 
depends not only on motivation (here, partisanship), but also ability to process, so 
cognitive ability (as evidenced by political knowledge or education) may interact with 
party identification in acceptance or rejection of messages regarding political beliefs. 
Motivated reasoning tends to be strongest among strong partisans who are highly 
knowledgeable.61 We can see this with both selective exposure and biased reasoning. 
Stroud shows that people with higher levels of political knowledge also tend to be 
knowledgeable about the partisan leanings of different media outlets.62 Consequently, 
partisanship and political knowledge interact such that selective exposure is amplified 
among those with high political knowledge. Taber, Cann, and Kucsova showed that 
political sophistication’s interaction with attitude strength made people with strong 
attitudes and high sophistication particularly likely to judge congenial information as 
more persuasive.63
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Meirick 45
Nyhan found that while political knowledge in general reduced the likelihood of 
holding a death panel misperception, political knowledge interacted with Republican 
identification such that higher-knowledge Republicans were more likely to hold the 
misperception.64 However, Nyhan and Reifler did not observe this knowledge/party 
identification interaction, albeit in an experiment with a student sample.65 Although 
the interaction of partisanship and education (as opposed to knowledge) has not been 
tested, the literature on party and knowledge is heuristic.
H5: Party identification and education will interact such that education will 
amplify party differences in belief in death panels.
Education and news exposure might interact as well. In most cases, we would 
expect high education and greater news exposure to additively (or perhaps multiplica-
tively) reduce misperceptions. However, Johansen and Joslyn found that education 
and Fox News viewership interacted such that among Fox News viewers, those high 
in education were no less likely to hold misperceptions about the Iraq War than those 
low in education.66 The explanation they offered was that those high in education have 
in place cognitive structures that make it relatively easy for them to store and retrieve 
information.67 Thus they can draw on this information to question or resist mes-
sages.68 But if the information environment is unbalanced or contains a high level of 
misinformation, then the highly educated are less likely to have alternative informa-
tion or to challenge frequently encountered messages. However, in light of the fact 
that knowledgeable news consumers also engage in more partisan selective expo-
sure,69 the more likely explanation is that partisan news exposure actually gives these 
knowledgeable consumers more ammunition with which to defend any closely held 
but mistaken beliefs.
H6: Education and Fox News viewership will interact such that Fox News view-
ership is associated with misperceptions especially among those higher in 
education.
RQ3: How will education interact with exposure to death panel news and other 
news sources?
Method
The data for this study come from the weekly News Interest Index Survey conducted for 
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, August 14-17, 2009. This was a 
national random-digit-dial survey that included cell phones as well as land lines.70
Sample
The sample (N = 1,003) was evenly divided between males (49.9%) and females 
(50.1%). The median age category was fifty-five to fifty-nine, higher than the median 
for adults of forty-five to forty-nine in the 2010 census. Politically, 38% of the sample 
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identified as Republican or leaning that way, with 12.3% Independents and the rest, 
almost 50%, leaning or identifying as Democratic, similar to a 37/15/48 split in a 2008 
Gallup poll.71 Almost 70% had some education beyond high school, higher than the 
55% in the census. Non-Hispanic whites made up 77.7% of the sample, with 9% of 
the sample identifying as African American and 7.3% as Hispanic. The 2010 census 
allowed multiple responses and asked a separate question on Hispanic ethnicity, but 
77% identified as white, 13.3% as African American, and 15.8% as Hispanic.
Measures
Exposure to death panel news. To assess how much people had been exposed to the 
death panel claim, the survey asked, “Critics of health care reform legislation say it 
includes creation of so-called ‘death panels’ or government organizations that will 
make decisions about who will and will not receive health services. How much have 
you heard about this?” Response options were a lot, a little, and nothing at all. (Those 
responding nothing at all were not asked if they thought the claim was true, the depen-
dent measure, so effectively this was a dichotomous measure for the purposes of this 
study.)
Belief in death panel misperception. Respondents were asked, “From what you 
know, do you think it is true or not true that the health care legislation will create 
these so-called ‘death panels’?” Responses were recoded such that those indicating 
they thought the death panel claim was true were assigned a score of 1 and others 
were given a score of 0.
News source exposure. Respondents were asked whether or not they got news regu-
larly from each of the following sources: Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, nightly network 
news, local TV news, newspapers, radio, and the Internet. The question was phrased, 
“Now I’d like to ask you about where you get most of your news these days. For each 
item that I read, please tell me if it is something you do regularly, or not.” Each item 
was coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no).
Issue attention. As a control measure, respondents were asked, “Did you follow the 
debate over health care reform very closely, fairly closely, not too closely, or not at all 
closely?”
Perceived press slant. Because Fox News sets itself apart from the mainstream media, 
we included as a control a measure of respondents’ perceptions of the media’s treat-
ment of Obama. It was worded, “Do you think the press has been too critical, not criti-
cal enough, or fair in the way it has covered Barack Obama?” Responses were coded 
such that the highest score indicated a perceived pro-Obama press slant, middle scores 
indicated perceived press fairness, and the lowest scores indicated perceived press 
hostility toward Obama.
Party identification. Respondents were asked, “In politics, as of today, do you con-
sider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an independent.” Independents were then 
asked if they lean more toward the Democratic or Republican Party. Combining these 
two items created a 5-point scale from Republican (1) to Democrat (5), with Indepen-
dent as a midpoint (3).
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Education. Respondents were asked to indicate the highest level of schooling they 
had completed. Responses were grouped in seven categories, from eighth grade or less 
to a postgraduate degree.
Race. In the survey, respondents were asked whether or not they were Hispanic and 
could select as many racial categories as they felt applied to them. For this analysis, 
race was coded dichotomously as 1 for non-Hispanic Caucasian and 0 for minority, 
Hispanic, or mixed race.
Demographics. The analysis also included gender, age (thirteen categories ranging 
from “18 to 20” to “75 and older”), and income (above or below $50,000 a year).72
Results
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression was used 
in the analyses. Variables involved in interactions were centered around zero to avoid 
collinearity with the interaction terms. To shed some additional light on the education 
and party identification interactions, the analysis was rerun with subgroups on those 
two variables. The low education subgroup consisted of those with less than a four-
year college degree, while the high education group had that level of schooling or 
higher. The party subgroups had Republican and Republican leaners in one category 
and others (Independents, Democrats, and those leaning that way) in another.
The results are reported in Table 1. In the interests of space, results for race, sex, 
age, and income were not reported in the table, but significant coefficients are noted 
here. Being Caucasian had a negative relationship with death panel misperception 
(b = –.58, SE = .26, p < .05). Sex (b = .03, SE = .21, ns), age (b = –.01, SE = .03, ns), 
and income (b = –.33, SE = .22, ns) were unrelated to belief in death panels among the 
overall sample. However, in the low education subgroup, income was negatively 
related with the misperception (b = –.55, SE = .28, p < .05), and age had a negative 
relationship with the misperception that approached significance among non-Republicans 
(b = –.09, SE = .05, p < .10). Of the other control variables, how closely one followed 
health care news was negatively related with the death panel misperception in the 
overall sample as well as among Republicans and respondents low in education. 
Perception of a pro-Obama slant in news coverage was positively related with the 
misperception in the overall sample and every subgroup.
H1 predicted that party identification would be related to death panel mispercep-
tion. The significant negative coefficient (b = –.56, SE = .12, p < .001) shows that 
belief in death panels is less likely for Democrats and more likely for Republicans. H1 
is supported.
H2 predicted that those who regularly view Fox News would be more likely to 
believe the death panel misperception than those who do not. This was the case (b = 
.48, SE = .11, p < .001). H2 is supported. In answer to RQ1, the only other specific 
media source that had a main effect on death panel misperception was newspapers: 
Regular readers were less likely to believe in death panels in the overall sample, as 
well as the education and party subgroups. Exposure to death panel news was posi-
tively related to belief in death panels.
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Table 1. Predictors of Death Panel Misperception
All Low education
High 
education Republican
Not 
Republican
Education −.31*  (.13) −.45*  (.20) −.21 (.18)
Party ID 
(Democrat)
−.56***  (.12) −.72***  (.16) −.36† (.22)  
Follow health 
reform news
−.25*  (.12) −.33*  (.15) .04 (.23) −.68** (.21) .14 (.16)
Perceived news 
slant (pro-
Obama)
.77***  (.16) .73***  (.19) .79** (.29) .68** (.22) .83***(.24)
Exposure to 
death panel 
news
.47***  (.13) .62***  (.17) .19 (.23) .25  (.19) .72***(.20)
Fox News .48***  (.11) .21  (.13) .92*** (.19) .26†  (.15) .57***(.15)
MSNBC .03  (.12) .09  (.14) −.11 (.20) .18  (.16) −.11 (.16)
CNN −.08  (.11) .03  (.14) −.26 (.21) −.13  (.16) −.03 (.16)
Network news −.10  (.12) .06  (.15) −.42* (.20) −.01  (.16) −.18 (.17)
Local TV news .01  (.12) −.13  (.16) .32 (.20) .28†  (.17) −.12 (.17)
Newspaper −.45***  (.11) −.41**  (.14) −.57** (.20) −.31*  (.16) −.50***(.16)
Radio .14  (.11) .18  (.14) .06 (.19) .37*  (.15) .04 (.16)
Internet −.10  (.12) −.16  (.15) .05 (.19) .05  (.16) −.25 (.17)
Party × education .08  (.12)  
Party × exposure .02  (.12) −.04  (.15) .11 (.22)  
Party × Fox 
News
.15  (.10) .11  (.13) .12 (.19)  
Party × MSNBC −.06  (.11) .00  (.13) −.23 (.20)  
Party × CNN .00  (.11) −.02  (.13) .08 (.20)  
Party × network 
news
−.05  (.11) .09  (.14) −.30 (.20)  
Party × 
newspaper
−.23*  (.11) −.29**  (.13) −.17 (.19)  
Party × radio −.21*  (.11) −.08  (.13) −.47* (.19)  
Party × Internet −.11  (.11) −.17  (.13) −.02 (.19)  
Party × local TV −.20  (.12) −.20  (.15) −.06 (.20)  
Education × 
exposure
−.33*  (.12) −.40*  (.19) −.41* (.19)
Education × Fox 
News
.35**  (.11) .49**  (.17) .25 (.15)
Pseudo-R2 .395 .381 .445 .363 .307
N 751 432 317 293 456
Coefficients are unstandardized logistic regression weights. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
Control variables not shown but included in the model: race, sex, age, and income. Also not shown are 
nonsignificant interactions between education and other media use variables.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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H3 concerned party identification interactions with Fox News and with exposure to 
death panel news that were expected to amplify party differences in misperceptions. 
However, neither of these interactions was significant. Moreover, the sign for the 
interactions was the opposite of what was predicted. Looking at the party subgroups, 
it appears that Fox News viewership significantly increased misperceptions for non-
Republicans (b = .57, SE = .15, p < .001), while the relationship between Fox News 
and death panel belief only approached significance for Republicans (b = .26, SE = .15, 
p < .10). Exposure to death panel news was significant only for non-Republicans 
(b = .72, SE = .20, p < .001). H3 is not supported.
In answer to RQ2, party identification had significant interactions with newspaper 
and radio use in the overall sample. Specifically, regular use of newspapers had a sig-
nificant negative relationship with misperception for both Republicans and non-
Republicans, although the latter was stronger. Regular radio and news use was 
associated with greater likelihood of misperception among Republicans, but not 
non-Republicans.
H4 was that education would be negatively related to the death panel mispercep-
tion. This was the case (b = –.31, SE = .13, p < .05). H4 is supported.
H5 predicted that party identification and education would interact such that educa-
tion would amplify party differences in belief in death panels. The coefficient for this 
interaction was not significant. It is worth noting that party identification was a signifi-
cant predictor of misperception for those low in education, but only approached sig-
nificance for those high in education, contrary to the hypothesis. H5 is not supported.
H6 predicted that Fox News viewership and education would interact such that Fox 
News viewership would be related with misperceptions, especially among those higher 
in education. The education-by-Fox interaction was positive and significant in the 
overall sample (b = .35, SE = .11, p < .01), consistent with the prediction. Looking at 
the education subgroups, Fox News viewership was strongly associated with misper-
ceptions among respondents high in education (b = .92, SE = .19, p < .001), but not 
among those in the low education subgroup (b = .21, SE = .13, ns). Also noteworthy is 
that the education-by-Fox interaction was significant among the Republican group, 
but not the non-Republican group, suggestive of a three-way interaction. H6 is sup-
ported. In answer to RQ3, education’s interaction with exposure to death panel news 
in general was significant but negative in the overall sample (b = –.33, SE = .12, p < .01). 
It was those low in education for whom exposure to death panel news predicted 
misperception (b = .62, SE = .17, p < .001), while the high education subgroup had no 
such relationship (b = .19, SE = .23, ns). No other news source had a significant inter-
action with education.
Discussion
This study drew on the literature in motivated reasoning for its framework in examin-
ing the misperception that health care reform would create death panels. In this frame-
work, we investigated the main effects and interactions of partisanship, news 
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exposure, and education. While there was some evidence suggestive of motivated 
reasoning, there were also indications that pointed to the power of news media to 
convey information (or misinformation) across partisan lines. Finally, this study iden-
tified a complex role for education in both inhibiting misperceptions (as a main effect) 
and promoting them (as an interaction).
It was expected that Republicans would be more likely to hold this misperception, 
and they were. The misperception was probably attractive to them; it made a bill and 
a president they opposed seem worse. They had relatively little motivation to closely 
examine the false claim. This was consistent with the motivated reasoning hypothesis. 
Also as expected, Fox News exposure was related to the death panel misperception, 
much as it was to misperceptions about the Iraq War.73 If the “Fox effect” had been 
simply a matter of preaching to a selectively exposed Republican choir, it also would 
have been consistent with motivated reasoning. Indeed, we had expected party ID and 
Fox News exposure to interact such that Republican viewers would be especially 
receptive to death panel claims made on Fox News, while Democratic viewers would 
exert more resistance. However, there was no such interaction, and Fox News viewer-
ship was positively related to the misperception for non-Republicans, while the rela-
tionship for Republicans only approached significance. Rather than polarize 
perceptions as predicted, Fox News exposure contributed to a mainstreaming of (mis-
taken) beliefs. This is consistent with Feldman’s finding that exposure to a Glenn Beck 
program taking a position against expansion of the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) led to similar anti-SCHIP attitude change for conservatives, moder-
ates, and liberals alike.74 That said, non-Republicans who regularly watch Fox News 
may do so because they are more receptive to Republican messages than other non-
Republicans, so a relative selective exposure effect may be at work. A post hoc test 
showed that among non-Republicans, regular Fox News viewers were closer to the 
political middle (3 on the 1-5 scale) on the partisanship item (M = 4.23, SD = 0.87) 
than those who watched it only a little (M = 4.37, SD = 0.75), t(599) = 2.03, p < .05.
There were instances of party-by-news interactions for radio news and newspapers, 
offering some limited support for motivated reasoning. These are general categories of 
news media rather than specific outlets. Exposure to radio news was related to the 
misperception for Republicans, but not non-Republicans. News talk radio is domi-
nated by conservative voices,75 which may account for the effect on Republicans, but 
the Pew survey did not distinguish between news talk and less opinion-oriented radio 
news such as National Public Radio News. It may be that the difference in sign between 
Republicans and non-Republicans in this interaction reflects partisan selective expo-
sure, with Republicans generally choosing conservative outlets within that medium. 
On the other hand, the interactions between party and news use for newspaper expo-
sure resulted from the negative relationship between exposure and the misperception 
being stronger for non-Republicans than for Republicans, although both were signifi-
cant. There is probably relatively little selective exposure with newspapers.76 Although 
there are hundreds of newspapers in the United States, most areas are dominated by 
one local newspaper, whose national political coverage usually comes from the 
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Associated Press, which did fact check the death panel claim. Newspapers (aside from 
their editorial pages) generally abide by the traditional norm of objectivity,77 so the 
smaller effect of newspaper use in discouraging misperception among Republicans 
may reflect biased processing and the greater degree to which Republicans discount 
information from the mainstream news media as biased.78
Education did reduce the likelihood of misperception, as expected.79 Education was 
a proxy for political knowledge, which has been shown to interact with partisanship to 
polarize beliefs via motivated reasoning. This study was perhaps the first to test the 
interaction of education and party identification as a predictor of misperception, but it 
was not significant. In fact, it appeared that party ID was more predictive of belief in 
death panels among those lower in education, contrary to the hypothesis. Although 
generally knowledge makes party ID more predictive of beliefs, attitudes, and behav-
ior,80 it may instead be the case that party ID was a low-information heuristic for those 
low in education,81 while those higher in education were guided more by elite partisan 
voices in the news.82
And we did see education interactions with exposure to death panel news and Fox 
News, but with opposite signs. Exposure to death panel news in general was signifi-
cantly related to greater belief in death panels among the low education group. 
Typically those lower in education will be less likely to be exposed to a message or 
recall it, but if they are exposed, they will be more likely to accept it because they lack 
the resistance capabilities of those with more education.83 It may also be that those 
lower in education with high exposure did not retain much beyond the death panel 
claim itself and failed to gain a more balanced mix of considerations. By contrast, the 
education interaction with Fox News was such that exposure was significantly related 
to misperception among those with high education, but not those with lower educa-
tion. To the extent that those higher in education engage in selective exposure, it 
makes sense that highly educated people who chose Fox News would be more recep-
tive to a belief in death panels. Also indicative of motivated reasoning is the fact that 
the Fox-by-education interaction was significant for Republicans (b = .49, SE = .17, 
p < .01), but not non-Republicans (b = .25, SE = .15, ns). This suggests a three-way 
interaction under which Republicans with high knowledge who watch Fox News are 
more likely to believe in death panels than we might otherwise expect.
The major limitation of this study is that it relies on cross-sectional data, so strong 
causal claims cannot be made. That said, the death panel issue was emergent; it makes 
more sense to believe Fox News exposure contributed to this new misperception than 
the other way around, especially since party and several other variables were con-
trolled. Still, longitudinal research could help to disentangle the effects of processing 
from those of (selective) news exposure. The data used fairly blunt, often dichotomous 
measures, which likely lost some of the richness of the phenomena under examination 
(especially in not distinguishing between conservative talk radio and other radio news) 
and certainly limited the range of statistical analyses available. Finally, this study 
addressed just one misperception. Further studies on a range of misperceptions, includ-
ing ones toward which liberals may be predisposed, should be done. Other directions 
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for future research include measuring a greater range of psychological correlates of 
motivated reasoning, such as dogmatism.84
In conclusion, this study suggests that while some citizens’ misperceptions are 
likely the product of motivated reasoning, others may result from the information 
environment. If so, misperceptions would have greater impact on elections than if 
they were merely an effect of disliking a candidate or party. Instead of a static elec-
toral playing field determined almost entirely by party identification, we would see 
greater flux in elections that reflected changes in the information environment. The 
2010 midterm election, a third straight “‘change’ election,” seemed to give credence 
to the latter understanding as post-2008 talk of a permanent Democratic majority 
gave way to a Republican takeover of the House.85 To the extent that beliefs arise 
from processing of information that is motivated by accuracy rather than directional 
goals, democracy should benefit—as long as the information is not misinformation. 
To the extent that misperceptions arise from misinformation and affect political 
behavior, they have the potential to undermine the democratic process. Further 
research should attempt to more precisely identify the causes and consequences of 
political misperceptions.
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